ABSTRACT To stabilize the output variability of renewable energy sources (RESs), distributed RESs can be aggregated and treated as any other conventional generators in the existing electricity markets. This paper proposes a coalitional framework to cope with the uncertainty of distributed RESs. We consider the case when RES owners participate in a two-settlement wholesale market, and a market operator financially penalizes the deviation of real-time generation from the day-ahead contract. Under the two-settlement market, we show that the grand coalition is stable and the core is non-empty so that there exists a revenue allocation vector that incentivizes the RES owners to stay in the grand coalition. Then, we propose a bidding strategy called Gaussian residual bidding (GRB) to maximize the coalition gain under different price-penalty ratio in the two-settlement process. We show that the GRB strategy makes the game a convex cooperative game. Thus the Shapley value lies within the core and can be used for fair revenue allocation. Our extensive simulations with real data demonstrate that the GRB strategy combined with the coalitional framework substantially increases both social welfare and individual revenue under various market scenarios compared to existing empirical quantile bidding and the forecast bidding strategies.
INDEX TERMS
Day-ahead bid for player i (coalition N ). V i (N ) Realized revenue of player i (coalition N ). U i (N ) Expected revenue of player i (coalition N ).
F R
Cumulative distribution function of R. F R Empirical cumulative distribution function.
Cumulative distribution function of Gaussian residual bidding.
φ(N , U ) the Shapley value of player of grand coalition N and utility function U . β(N ) Additional revenue of N by the Shapley value.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, energy markets have been rapidly evolving with the advent of renewable energy sources (RESs), electric vehicles, and smart grids. For example, New York State has recently implemented its Reforming the Energy Vision strategy to create a greener, more resilient and affordable energy system by utilizing RESs in community-based microgrids [1] . In the UK, 10 million households are expected to have rooftop solar panels by 2020 and reformulate energy market structures as prosumers [2] . Moreover, since clean and cost effective RESs contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emission, the RES penetration is expected to keep increasing. However, the participation of the RES owners in primary wholesale electricity markets is still challenging because of the inherent volatility of RES. To secure power system from volatility and imbalance, standard electricity markets may follow a two-settlement process where an independent system operator (ISO) manages two markets: an ex-ante day-ahead forward market and an ex-post real-time (or imbalance settlement) market [3] . The principle is to financially penalize the bidding that is deviated from the contractual obligation of day-ahead. The details of electricity market operations, however, may vary depending on countries; for example, scheduling adjustment in the intra-day market can be used to mitigate the variability of RES, or additional incentive for accurate forecast may be given to RES.
When distributed RES owners individually participate in the market following the two-settlement process, RES owners can maximize their revenue by exploiting an intelligent bidding strategy which has been studied from various aspects [4] - [8] . Morales et al. [4] utilized the auto-regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model to characterize the uncertainties of both market price and wind power under a stochastic programming framework. Optimal contract for wind power producers (WPPs) was studied in [5] where WPPs are allowed to behave strategically, either curtail or produce their wind power once the day-ahead market is closed. The profit maximizing contract in a competitive electricity market was introduced by using the time-averaged distribution function of wind power generation [6] . As an auction framework [7] , Tang and Jain showed that bidding the probability distribution of wind generation is more costefficient than bidding the cost functions (balancing cost) in the proposed stochastic auction paradigm. To improve the reliability in the day-ahead market, various unit commitment formulations were studied under different wind penetration levels in terms of operating cost and computing time [8] .
Reducing the variability of RES also contributes to maximizing revenue in addition to improving forecast accuracy. To mitigate the volatility of renewable generations, energy storage system can be deployed, but it requires significant capital investment. By contrast, the aggregation of statistically diverse RESs can be considered almost at no cost. Indeed, the aggregated wind power is treated as any other conventional generators in the existing market with technical rules in Spain and UK [9] . Then the economical aspect of RES aggregation was analyzed using cooperative game theory [10] , [11] . In doing this, the copper plate model was assumed where all RESs are connected to one bus to simplify the physical constraints of the grid.
To encourage the cooperation, the cooperative revenue should be fairly allocated, and there are two well-known solutions: the Shapley value and the nucleolus. The Shapley value has many nice properties such as efficiency, symmetry, balanced contribution, and also has the closed form expression [12] . Furthermore, in the case of convex game, the Shapely value lies in the core so that the grand coalition is stable. However, in the literature, the two-settlement process with wind power aggregation turns out to be not a convex game as demonstrated by counter-examples [13] , [14] .
In the case of a balanced game where the core is non-empty, the nucleolus also provides the unique and stable revenue allocation. However, the calculation of the nucleolus can be computationally demanding, and thus a series of works tried to develop alternative revenue allocation mechanisms such as worst-case excess minimizing imputation, competitive payoff, incentive compatible allocation, etc [10] , [14] - [17] .
In this paper, we investigate the cooperative game regarding the aggregation of RESs. Specifically, we are interested in under which circumstances the fair revenue allocation is possible through the Shapley value. If the considered cooperative game under the two-settlement process is a convex game then using the Shapely value indeed encourages the RES owners to participate in the grand coalition. In this regard, we study the coalitional framework under the two-settlement process and propose a bidding strategy that can make the proposed cooperative game convex. We summarize our key contributions as follows.
First, we propose a coalitional framework where all the participants are encouraged to join the grand coalition to alleviate the penalty incurred by the mismatch between the bidding and the actual delivery. We show that, under the twosettlement market, the cooperative game is super-additive and the core is non-empty so that all RES owners join the grand coalition to maximize their revenues.
Second, we propose a Gaussian residual bidding (GRB) strategy where the forecasting error (residual) follows a normal distribution. The intuition is that, at best, the forecasting error of renewable generation has the normal distribution, which is the ultimate goal of the unbiased estimator. We show that as long as individual RES owners follow the GRB strategies, then the considered game becomes a convex cooperative game where the Shapely value lies within the core. Thus, fair revenue allocation is possible through the Shapley value.
Third, we demonstrate the proposed GRB strategy indeed works well with the real data of solar and wind power generation where our theoretical assumptions of independence and the normality of forecasting error may not hold any more. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that the GRB strategy combined with the coalitional framework substantially increases both social welfare and individual revenue compared to the baselines where the empirical distribution or point forecasting is used for day-ahead bidding.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model for RESs and electricity market is introduced. In Section III, cooperative offering framework is verified, and the GRB strategy is proposed in Section IV. In Section V, we explain overall simulation framework including fair revenue distribution and verify simulation results with real data. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section we describe a system model for renewable energy market with the two-settlement process. For theoretical analysis, we assume the copper plate model as in [10] to focus on the game-theoretic aspects of RES cooperation, which can serve as groundwork for future development considering practical details, e.g., network topology, grid constraints, transmission loss, etc.
A. ELECTRICITY MARKET MODEL
The overall system model shown in Fig. 1 mainly consists of a wholesale electricity market and its participants (RES owners). RES owner can have a single or multiple distributed RESs (PV and wind turbine) for their generation resource. With RESs, each owner can participate in the wholesale electricity market either as an individual player or a group of RES owners within a coalitional framework. We consider that the wholesale electricity market is based on the twosettlement system where participants can contract with ISO to sell their generation in an ex-ante day-ahead forward market. Let t ∈ T be a discrete time index of the delivering day where T is a bidding horizon, usually spanning 24 hours. The RES owner i ∈ N , where N is a set of all RES owners, bids e t i , the generation amount to be delivered, to the ISO at a given ISO's unit price p t ∈ R + for the time period t in a day-ahead forward market. In ex-post imbalance settlement phase, deviations from the contract offering of day-ahead are financially penalized by imbalance price per unit energy which is determined through the real-time spot market. There are two imbalances according to the type of deviations: positive imbalance and negative imbalance. The RES owner gets paid at the positive imbalance price, denoted by λ t ∈ R, if it generates more than what it bids. By contrast, the RES owner should pay the penalty at the negative imbalance price, denoted by q t ∈ R + , if it cannot fulfill its bidding quantity. Imbalance settlement can be further classified into single and dual pricing mechanisms. If λ t = q t , it is called single pricing mechanism, otherwise dual pricing mechanism. To be general, we consider the dual pricing.
To simplify the market model, p t , q t and λ t , which are determined through the day-ahead and real-time markets, are assumed to be known day-ahead. Note that price forecasting is another major research issue in the smart grid, and is beyond the scope of this paper. Also, the RES owner i ∈ N is assumed to be a price-taker, and q t > p t > λ t holds to induce truthful bidding.
Let r t i be the real-time power generation at time t on the delivery day. Then the realized revenue of RES owner i with the bidding e t i is given by
Day-ahead profit
( 1) where (x) + = max(x, 0). The realized revenue is maximized when e t i is equal to r t i . However, when the RES owner i bids in a day-ahead market, r t i is unknown in advance. Thus, the bidding strategy in a day-ahead market should consider maximizing the expected revenue given by
where R t i denotes a random variable capturing the real-time power generation of the RES owner i at time t on the delivery day.
B. INDIVIDUAL BIDDING STRATEGY
If the probability distribution of R t i in (2) is known, the optimal biddingê t i can be calculated by using the Leibniz integral rule [6] 
Note that the optimal bidding of (3) depends on the ratio of day-ahead price p t and imbalance prices q t and λ t . The subtlety of optimal bidding is that the actual distribution of R t i at the time of bidding should be estimated.
III. COALITIONAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we develop a coalitional framework for the RES owners. We start with no specific assumption about the distribution of R t i except that R t i is independent for all i ∈ N by geographically sufficient separation. This assumption will be removed in Section V.
A. FORMULATION OF COALITIONS
A coalition in the cooperative game theory is defined by a set of players and a value (utility) function, quantifying how well each coalition of players can do for itself [18] . In our cooperative game, a set of all players (RES owners) is N and let N = |N |.
A value function of the cooperative game is the expected revenue of coalition, which is denoted by U t N for any coalition N ⊆ N at a time period t. From now on, for notational VOLUME 6, 2018 simplicity, we omit the time index t unless required. Then the value function for N is given by
where R N = i∈N R i , and e N is the bidding of coalition N , i.e., e N = F
We assume the process of forming a coalition is controlled by an automated agent: collecting participants' information, bidding optimal amount in day-ahead market, and allocating the settled revenue to participants.
B. SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
Now we show that the grand coalition, where all players join the same coalition N , is optimal in terms of total revenue (or called social welfare) maximization in the two-settlement electricity market. To do so, we first consider the superadditivity of the expected revenue U .
Definition 1 U is super-additive if for any disjoint sets
Unlike our previous work of [11] where λ = 0, we prove the super-additivity for all λ ∈ R.
Proof: We consider two disjoint and exhaustive subsets N 1 and N 2 , where N 1 ∩ N 2 = ∅ and N 1 ∪ N 2 = N for any coalition N . If expected revenue U with λ ≤ 0 (i.e., excessive generation is also penalized, see [10] , [14] ), it is straightforward to show that U N 1 ∪N 2 ≥ U N 1 + U N 2 from the fact that (x) + + (y) + ≥ (x + y) + for any real values of x and y. However, this method does not work when λ is positive because two inequalities of q and λ contradict each other. Therefore, we detour the proof by using U N which provides the same e N of (3). Let p = p − λ and q = q − λ, then U N is given by
where q > p > 0 also holds by the definition. Then, the following equality between U N and U N holds for given R N from the property of the positive part function, i.e., x = x + − (−x) + , and we have
From (6), we can represent U N 1 +U N 2 as (7), as shown at the bottom of this page. The inequaility in (8) is straight forward from (x) + + (y) + ≥ (x + y) + for any x and y. Then inequality of (9), as shown at the bottom of this page, holds from the fact that e N is optimal for R N and the linearity of expectation. Finally, we have 
C. EXISTENCE OF THE CORE
Even if the grand coalition can maximize the social welfare, it is not sufficient to induce players' cooperative behavior. Therefore a fair revenue allocation mechanism is required so that players are willing to form the grand coalition and do not deviate from the grand coalition to get higher revenue. In this regard, aforementioned revenue allocation can be identified by using the concept of core, which is a set of imputation (efficient and individually rational revenue allocation) that cannot be further improved by dividing the grand coalition into subsets [19] .
Definition 2 The core of the game is
where x is a vector of revenue allocation.
Each component x i is the distributed revenue to player i. The former and the latter conditions in the definition imply efficiency and coalitional rationality of revenue allocation, respectively. If the core of the game is non-empty, then there exists a feasible revenue allocation in which no group of players has an incentive to abandon the coalition, i.e., the grand coalition is stable [12] .
Proposition 2 The core of the considered cooperative game is non-empty.
Proof: This proposition can be proved by using the Bondareva-Shapley theorem [12] , [20] . Let P be the power set of N , which is the set of all subsets. Then we define P(i) as the set of all subsets that include player i as one of their elements. The Bondareva-Shapley theorem states that the core of the game is non-empty if and only if for a function γ (·) that satisfies N ∈P(i) γ (N ) = 1, ∀i ∈ N and 0 ≤ γ (N ) ≤ 1, the following inequality holds
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We show (10) using the super-additivity as follows:
which completes the proof.
D. REVENUE ALLOCATION
Even though the core C is non-empty, finding a revenue allocation vector x ∈ C is another question. In this regard, one of the most well-known revenue allocation methods is the Shapley value. The Shapley value is a solution concept that is unique and expressed in closed-form, satisfying three axioms: 1) efficiency, 2) symmetry, and 3) balanced contribution. Let φ(N , U ) be the Shapley value of the grand coalition N with the utility function U , and φ i (N , U ) be its i-th element that is allocated revenue to player i. Then, based on the three axioms, φ i (N , U ) is the average marginal contribution of player i over possible coalitions, and can be computed as
where is a set of all |N |! orderings and N (π, i) is a subset of N that includes the participants whose order precedes i in the ordering π . In addition, the Shapley value lies in the core when the game is convex. However, the super-additivity does not guarantee the convexity of the game, and thus the Shapley value may not be in the core. Also, it is shown that the considered cooperative game is not convex by counterexamples with both expected and realized revenue [13] , [14] .
E. CONVEX GAME
In this subsection we study when the considered cooperative game becomes a convex game.
Definition 3 A cooperative game is convex if following super-modularity holds for U [21]:
U S∪T + U S∩T ≥ U S + U T , ∀S, T ⊆ N .
Proposition 3 If R i , ∀i ∈ N follows the Gaussian distribution and independent to R j , ∀j ∈ N \ {i}, then the cooperative game is a convex game.
Proof: To prove convex game, we use the equivalent inequality about super-modularity [22] .
Then R S , a random variable for generation of subgroup S ⊆ N , is in the form of R S ∼ N (µ S = i∈S µ i , σ 2 S = i∈S σ 2 i ). According to F R S , the CDF of Gaussian random variable, and its quantile function, the optimal bid for group S is given by e S = F 
By using the inverse Mills ratio [23] and
S f (e S ), and we have
respectively. Finally, from the inequality
S , which can be easily shown by squaring on both sides, following super-modularity holds.
IV. GAUSSIAN RESIDUAL BIDDING STRATEGY A. WHEN IS THE MODELING OF R t i As A GAUSSIAN RANDOM VARIABLE VALID
One might wonder what kind of renewable generation follows the Gaussian distribution. Indeed, the probability distribution of wind and PV generation are commonly modeled by Weibull distribution [24] and beta distribution [25] . However, the subtlety lies between the typical vs. conditional distributions. A typical distribution can be constructed by collecting the realized samples over some period of time, either minutes, hours, days or weeks. By contrast, R t i is not typical but conditioned on day-ahead information such as weather forecast, calendar date, historical generation data, etc. Thus, the uncertainty, and thus the distribution of R t i indeed depends on available endogenous/exogenous information and forecasting techniques. Hypothetically, if one can perfectly know the movement of the cloud covers with forecasting, R t i of PV generation tomorrow, for example, is no longer a random variable but a constant. Thus, our intuition is that the distribution of R t i depends on forecasting techniques, and the forecasting error can be modeled to follow the normal distribution by exploiting an unbiased estimator denoted by f i . Fig. 2 shows the error distributions of the wind power and PV forecast based on the real data of Elia (Belgium's only TSO) [26] . We see that the error distributions are well captured by the Gaussian distribution, and Gaussian based approach can be also found in the literature [27] - [29] .
B. GRB STRATEGY AND COALITIONAL BIDDING PROCESS
Inspired by the result of Proposition 3 and the observation as shown in Fig. 2 , we propose a novel bidding strategy called the GRB, which is based on a forecasting technology with the Gaussian error (or residual) distribution. The GRB strategy can use any Gaussian residual forecast model f i , and thus we model
where r i (f i ) and σ i (f i ) are the dayahead point forecast of generation and the standard deviation of forecast errors, respectively. In this paper we do not specify f i as long as it can achieve the normal error distribution with zero mean, and the specific implementation of f i is beyond the scope of this paper.
The overall process of the GRB strategy within coalitional framework is illustrated in Fig. 3 . First, each RES owner runs one's own Gaussian residual forecast model f i and the generation database. For a day-ahead market, the RES owner i ∈ N submits the forecast r i to the aggregator if the owner wants to participate in the coalition. The RES owner also can submit self-assessed forecast accuracy σ i or the aggregator can evaluate instead. Then, with r i and σ i of participants i ∈ S, the aggregator forms the distribution of the coalitional bidding, i.e., R S ∼ N ( i r i , i σ 2 i ). Next, the aggregator bids in the day-ahead market with the optimal bidding by the GRB strategy
and receives coalitional revenue including imbalance penalty after the real-time market is cleared. The aggregator calculates the Shapley value, and finally the RES owners receive individual payoffs.
C. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS OF THE GRB STRATEGY
In addition to inducing a convex game, possible advantages of utilizing the GRB and the Shapley value are as follows. First, it makes easier to obtain the PDF of coalitional generation by assuming independent error distributions. Thus the sum of independent Gaussian random variables works for the aggregator, and complex consensus protocol to confirm the probability distribution of coalition is not required. Second, the RES owner is induced to report true forecast information of R i which is the best approximation that can be achieved by i; there is no incentives to submit false forecast information R † i . From the perspective of i, the only way to increase revenue allocated to itself by the Shapley value is increasing U S∪{i} . Since R S∪{i} = R S + R i , reporting false forecast R † i induces the optimal bidding for R S + R † i which is not optimal for R S∪{i} . Hence, U S∪{i} will decrease when the RES owner i reports false forecast R † i .
V. CASE STUDY WITH REAL DATA
In the previous sections, theoretical derivation of the cooperative game has been carried out based on the expected revenue U . Though the optimal bidding and formulation of the grand coalition is derived from U in day-ahead, market clearing and revenue settlement are based on the realized revenue V . In this regard, the considered cooperative game may not be convex with the realized revenue due to the discrepancy originated from the following facts:
• The real distribution of R i may not be Gaussian.
• Forecast errors among players may not be independent.
• Revenue allocation is based on the realized revenue V i , not the expected revenue U i . Thus, throughout extensive simulations with real data, we verify how much revenue can be achieved by using the GRB strategy and whether the Shapley value of the realized revenue φ(N , V ) lies within the core.
We obtain real-time generation and day-ahead forecast data of RESs provided by Elia for one year [26] , and the data is aggregated by the region and the type of RESs. We use the dataset of seven renewable power providers: three wind power producers (WPP 1 ∼ 3) and four solar PV power producers (PVPP 1 ∼ 4). Generation capacities and the average power productions are given in Table 1 . Hence total seven players cooperate to form the grand coalition in the simulation during the entire year of 2016. To maximize the effectiveness of coalition, we assume that λ is zero in simulation, since high value of λ reduces the gap between individual participation and cooperation. Therefore, the optimal bidding is determined by the ratio p/q in the simulation. For comparison, we introduce two baseline strategies: the empirical time-averaged quantile function based bidding [6] , [10] and the point forecast based bidding [11] (hereafter, simply called empirical quantile bidding (EQB) and forecast bidding (FB), respectively). In the EQB strategy, the optimal bid is given by
is the quantile function of empirical time-averaged CDF. In the simulation, the quantile function of the EQB strategy is constructed by the historical generation data of past three months in the same time index t as used in [10] . By contrast, the FB strategy uses e i = r i (f i ). Note that the GRB becomes identical to the FB when p/q = 0.5.
The simulation process is as follows. First, we evaluate forecast accuracy of each player to derive the GRB strategy. Next, we compare the social welfare and individual revenue of three bidding strategies; EQB, FB, and GRB. Finally, we ascertain whether the Shapley value with realized revenue is in the core or not with different p/q ratio.
A. EVALUATION OF FORECAST ACCURACY
To utilize the GRB strategy, we evaluate forecast accuracy to calculate σ i (f i ) of each RES owner i ∈ N . In doing this,
The percentage errors over 100% are assumed to be outliers, which usually occurs when PV generation is near zero (at daybreak or sundown).
After the evaluation process, the bids e t N of EQB, FB, GRB bidding strategies are calculated. For example, Fig. 4 shows three-dimensional graph of real generations and hourly bids of the grand coalition on May 1, 2016. As can be seen, the bidding quantities of three strategies roughly follow the amount of real generation. Unlike FB, both GRB and EQB adapts their bids in p/q (i.e,. bid aggressively for high p/q, and vice versa, to maximize the revenue). However, EQB bids too conservatively for low p/q region, which leads to the loss of revenue. When p/q = 0.5, we see that GRB is identical to FB. 
B. REVENUE OF GRAND COALITION
Next, we compare the revenue of the grand coalition (cooperation) and total revenue of individual participation (non-cooperation). We set p = $50/MWh by considering the realistic market scenarios [6] , [7] , [10] and change q to consider various price-penalty ratios.
In Fig. 5 , cumulative social welfares of three bidding strategies in 2016 are compared under cooperation and noncooperation cases when p/q = 0.1, i.e., very high penalty scenario. As can be seen, the revenue of GRB significantly outperforms EQB and FB by achieving three times of the social welfare. The effect of the grand coalition is also substantial for all three bidding strategies. By sharing shortfall and surplus among players, forming the grand coalition increases the social welfare. Thus, the proposed GRB with cooperation achieves the highest revenue than the other cases, and the non-cooperative FB shows the worst result due to the high financial penalty for undelivered commitment. Fig. 6 shows the total social welfare in 2016 with varying p/q ratio. We observe that the coalition with GRB is the most VOLUME 6, 2018 desirable choice for all market scenarios (p/q) in terms of cumulative social welfare. The revenue of FB almost follows GRB. However, as mentioned above, FB is not flexible with respect to p/q and performs badly in low p/q region, even negative social welfare, due to high penalties of inaccurate forecasts. EQB achieves positive revenue in low p/q region unlike FB, but the revenue of EQB is substantially lower than that of GRB for all ranges of p/q because EQB does not utilize additional information in estimating R t i .
C. INDIVIDUAL REVENUE
Next, we examine the individual revenues in accordance with the bidding strategies and coalition, when the social welfare is allocated by the Shapley value. receiving the Shapley value (colored solid lines) is always better than individually participating in the two-settlement market, i.e., the Shapely value is individually rational. After one year of operation, we see that the GRB with the grand coalition achieves 5 times and 3 times higher revenues than the case of EQB with non-cooperation for WPP 1 and PVPP 1, respectively. Fig. 9 shows individual revenue and its composition when players form the grand coalition with the GRB strategy. In each bar, the bottom part (gray colored) represents the revenue that can be obtained without cooperation, and the top (hatched bar) represents additional revenue by cooperation and the Shapley value, respectively. As can be seen, WPP 3, the largest power provider, takes 32.2% of total social welfare. Although, in general, a large power provider is expected to have strong bargaining power, the share of WPP 3 in total social welfare does not exceed its contribution determined by the Shapley value. Since forecasting accuracy of each power provider is similar, the share of both individual and additional revenue are proportional to the average RES generation in Table 1 . 
D. THE SHAPLEY VALUE AND CORE
Finally, to verify whether the Shapley value of the proposed GRB strategy with realized revenue V (i.e., φ(N , V )) is in the core or not, we check if Definition 2 holds for all subsets and all values of p/q in terms of year-round additional revenue. The additional revenue of coalition N , β(N ), is a revenue increase by forming the grand coalition and receiving the Shapley value, and given by β(N ) = i∈N φ i (N , V ) − V N . Fig. 10 is three-dimensional bar plot of total additional revenue in 2016. Subgroup index represents a subset from ∅ to N , and there are total 128 subsets for |N | = 7. If there is no subgroup with negative β(N ) for a given p/q ratio (bars with the same color), coalitional rationality holds for the Shapley value of given p/q. Hence the Shapley value is in the core, and revenue of the grand coalition can be FIGURE 10. Additional revenue of the grand coalition with respect to all subsets when using the GRB strategy under varying p/q. fairly allocated by φ(N , V ). As can be seen, the result shows that β(N ) is positive in almost all cases of p/q and subset pairs; we found seven negative β(N ), but they occur when p/q = 0.05 and 0.1 which are the impractical cases with extremely high imbalance penalty. Also, the result shows that with high penalty (low p/q), β is higher than the low penalty (high p/q) region. In other words, the importance of cooperation increases in the high penalty market. Since year-round summation of Shapley value takes averaging effect in longterm, the simulation result is consistent with the theoretical analysis, i.e., the Shapley value of GRB strategy is in the core.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a coalitional framework of RESs in the two-settlement market based on the cooperative game theory, where RES owners can form a coalition to bid as a single entity and share the revenue among participants. We showed that within coalitional framework and optimal bidding based on the probabilistic approach, the grand coalition reduces imbalance penalty and guarantees maximum social welfare. We also proved that the core of the game is non-empty, hence there exists fair revenue allocation satisfying individual and coalitional rationalities. To utilize the Shapley value for fair revenue allocation, we investigated when the considered game becomes convex, and proposed the GRB strategy so that the Shapley value lies in the core. Extensive simulation results with real data verified that our theoretical analysis well matches with the realized revenue, and the proposed GRB strategy combined with the coalitional framework substantially increases both social welfare and individual revenue compared to the baselines.
The result can be further developed for the research of cooperative framework and bidding strategy considering grid constraints, energy storage system, transmission loss and other practical details.
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